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The human-computer interaction (HCI) has had a long and 
troublesome relationship to the role of ‘science’. HCI’s 
status as an academic object in terms of coherence and 
adequacy is often in question—leading to desires for 
establishing a true scientific discipline. In this paper I 
explore formative cognitive science influences on HCI, 
through the impact of early work on the design of input 
devices. The paper discusses a core idea that I argue has 
animated much HCI research since: the notion of scientific 
design spaces. In evaluating this concept, I disassemble the 
broader ‘picture of science’ in HCI and its role in 
constructing a disciplinary order for the increasingly 
diverse and overlapping research communities that 
contribute in some way to what we call ‘HCI’. In 
concluding I explore notions of rigour and debates around 
how we might reassess HCI’s disciplinarity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Human-computer interaction (HCI) is represented by a 
large and growing research community concerned with the 
study and design of interactive technologies. It rapidly 
emerged from the research labs of the 1970s, matching the 
lifetime of the Århus Decennial conferences. Perhaps 
characteristic of all ‘new’ research communities, anxieties 
have been expressed over its status as an academic object 
from the very beginning (indeed, as an early career 
researcher I myself have often felt a similar confusion about 
what HCI is as an academic object). Many of these 
anxieties centre around disciplinary shape and how that 
shape relates to ‘science’—the topic of this paper. 
Discussion about the role of science both in and of HCI can 
be traced to various formative exchanges in the early 1980s 
between Newell, Card, Carroll and Campbell around the 
deployment of cognitive psychology for designing user 
interfaces, and the prospects of developing “a science of 
human-computer interaction” [43, 12, 44]. Since then there 
have been sporadic expressions—a tendency if you will—
towards cultivating some element of ‘scientific 
disciplinarity’ for HCI. This may be seen in the form of 
panels and workshops on matters like scientific replication 
[58, 59] or interaction science [32] that have surfaced at the 
ACM CHI conference in the last few years. Most recently 
Liu et al. [36] and Kostakos [35] have argued that HCI is a 
poor scientific discipline when measured against other bone 
fide examples (such as those of the natural sciences or 
disciplines with ‘science’ in their title). In this analysis HCI 
is found devoid of central motor themes that are taken as a 
signature of thoroughbred scientific disciplines, thus 
representing a presumed failure of the HCI programme. 
Echoing the calls of Greenberg and Thimbleby in 1992 
[27], work is thus required to make HCI “more scientific” 
[35].  
In exploring these complex debates, this paper addresses a 
range of cognate concerns in HCI: ‘science’, ‘disciplinarity’ 
and ‘design’. The argument I present in this paper contends 
that the status anxiety over HCI as an academic object has 
its origins in the early formulation of HCI’s research 
practice. This practice blended the application of cognitivist 
orientations to scientific reasoning with Simon’s view of 
design [56], in order to establish a particular research 
idea—what I refer to as the scientific design space. This 
guides both what human-computer interactions are, and 
how we investigate them. This idea, I argue, has configured 
how many HCI researchers relate to interactive artefacts in 
their work practices and thus shaping HCI’s disciplinary 
circumstances and discussions.  
It is not the intention of this paper to suggest that cognitivist 
scientific reasoning is the only orientation to reasoning 
present in HCI research. It is also not within the scope of 
this paper to fully map out the landscape of different forms 
of reasoning in HCI (e.g., the ‘designerly’), nor to evaluate 
the claims of different approaches compared with their 
achievements. Neither is it the intention to imply that 
disciplinary anxiety is solvable. Instead, this paper focusses 
upon cognitivist scientific reasoning and its expression 
through the scientific design space, arguing that this has 
been an important and persistent force in the broader logics 
of significant portions of HCI’s programme. This is despite 
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repeated suggestions of transformative intellectual changes 
that HCI as a whole may have gone through.  
This paper firstly unpacks the debates that I broadly 
subsume into questions over the status of HCI as an 
academic object and its relationship to ‘science’; through 
this I detail two important anxieties that have animated this 
debate. I then relate these to a core concept—the scientific 
design space—that I argue emerged in HCI’s formative 
years at the confluence of cognitive science and interface 
engineering challenges. In this I revisit HCI’s relationship 
to cognitive science, and the introduction of a particular 
‘picture of science’, tracking subsequent influence of this 
on attempts at crafting HCI’s disciplinary architecture. 
Finally, the paper’s discussion returns to evaluate these 
concepts. 
THE STATUS OF HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION 
An external view of HCI’s disciplinary status could assume 
that it is secure. For instance, in CHI 2007’s opening 
address, Stuart Feldman (then president of the ACM) 
described the HCI research as “absolutely adherent to the 
classic scientific method” [1]. But the picture from within 
HCI seems radically different. By reviewing broad 
discussions around HCI’s disciplinarity in this section, I 
intend to sketch a background for subsequently addressing 
the specifics of ‘science’ in HCI. 
Questions over HCI’s disciplinarity emerged early in its 
development. In 1987 ergonomist and HCI pioneer Brian 
Shackel asked during his INTERACT conference keynote 
whether “HCI was a discipline, or merely a meeting 
between other disciplines” [15]; a couple of years later, 
Long, Dowell, Carroll and others discussed what kind of 
discipline HCI might be described as [38, 11]. Although 
Carroll characterises this and his exchanges with Newell 
and Card as the “theory crisis” of the mid-1980s [11 p. 4], 
one only need glance at a standard textbook to notice that 
HCI seems still to be routinely presented by an ambiguous 
constellation of overlapping disciplinary descriptors (e.g., 
interaction design, user experience, etc.). The term itself is 
also problematised, and HCI can be taken to perhaps 
subsume or compose these various related descriptors. For 
example, one position adopted by a key textbook—
Interaction Design: Beyond Human-Computer Interaction 
[51]—formulates HCI as a contributing academic discipline 
to a broader field of interaction design. 
Here I sketch out two features of HCI’s disciplinary 
anxieties: incoherence and inadequacy. Later on I argue that 
invocations of ‘science’ are often attempts to remedy these 
perceived problems in HCI. 
Incoherence 
In essence, the core of the incoherence problem lies in the 
idea that HCI seemingly has few ‘secured’ propositions that 
researchers generally agree upon (except, perhaps Fitts’s 
Law?), and no obvious shared commitment to a certain set 
of problems or ways of approaching them [36]. 
Debate about this incoherence problem has two poles of 
discussion: descriptions of ‘how things are’ (which often 
include explanations), and prescriptions of ‘how things 
should be’. A key way of describing present incoherence to 
HCI is the accumulation of diversity in its approaches over 
time. As Rogers states, “HCI keeps recasting its net ever 
wider, which has the effect of subsuming [other splinter 
fields such as CSCW and ubicomp]” [50 p. 3]. As a matter 
of this accumulation, HCI researchers have tended to ‘bolt 
on’ new approaches repeatedly. This accumulation has 
involved accommodating new epistemological perspectives 
and the disciplinary objects that come with them. This is 
perhaps best illustrated by theory and theorising in HCI, 
which has been accorded importance given its association 
as a signature of established disciplines. Beginning with a 
particular cohort of theories drawn from cognitive science 
and psychology, ‘theory’ in HCI has increasingly been 
adopted from diverse origin disciplines [50, 29]. This has 
introduced a great diversity of technical senses in which 
‘theory’ is meant (see [50 pp. 16-17] for a descriptive 
account). Question marks are raised over what qualifies, 
what a theory is useful for, how they are to be organised, 
what the relationships between them actually are, how new 
theories should (or can) be developed, amalgamated, 
divided, or simply decided as ‘good’ or ‘bad’, relevant or 
out of scope. As Bederson and Shneiderman admit prior to 
an attempt to define theory in information visualisation and 
HCI, “a brief investigation of the language of theories 
reveals its confusion and inconsistent application across 
disciplines, countries, and cultures” [2].  
With theory also comes attendant epistemological 
commitments (which may or may not be honoured, of 
course) and other associated objects. For instance, these are 
the methods (e.g., experimental design, experience 
sampling, anthropological ethnography) and corresponding 
instruments for administering these methods (e.g., NASA 
TLX, social network analysis metrics [23]).  
This “remarkable expansion” [50 p. xi] tends to be taken 
sometimes as indications of success (in the form of rich 
emerging discipline) but perhaps more significantly as a 
signifier of problems, such that—as Carroll states—“an 
ironic downside of the inclusive multidisciplinarity of HCI 
is fragmentation” [10]. Similar views are expressed perhaps 
most commonly within the program committees of the SIG 
CHI conference, and in other public fora e.g., Interactions 
magazine [29]. An absence of uniformity of theory, method 
and instrument is unsettling when compared to formal 
accounts of how disciplines should be, particularly the 
disciplines with coveted scientific status. The choice thus 
seems stark; Rogers raises the question of prescribing 
disciplinary order: i.e., whether to “stem the tide and 
impose some order and rules or let the field continue to 
expand in an unruly fashion” [50 p. 2]. The dichotomy 
 
 
presented is now a familiar one where the opposite of 
disciplinary prescription is “unruly”. 
What of the response to this in HCI? One possibility is to 
redescribe HCI in such a way that creates some semblance 
of order. This includes attempts to rationalise the existing 
range of work that occupies the HCI space, perhaps most 
visibly represented in discussions around ‘turns’ [50] 
‘waves’ [5] and ‘paradigms’ [30]. For instance, Rogers 
offers four key turns: design (early 1990s), culture (late 
2000s), ‘the wild’ (mid 1990s) and embodiment (early 
2000s) [50].  
Another way is to prescribe standardisation; and where 
standardisation comes, so do calls for ‘scientific’ ways of 
establishing order. These calls are largely intended, I think, 
to strengthen HCI’s disciplinary coherence. For example, 
Whittaker et al. argue that HCI’s “radical invention model” 
works against “the development of a ‘science’ of HCI”, 
with their proposed solution being the development of 
standardised sets of “reference tasks” to support 
“cumulative research” [57]. This view is consonant with 
programmatic statements arguing for developing a more 
science-like approach in HCI through practices like routine 
replication [27, 26, 58, 59, 31] or other prescribed forms of 
evaluation [45]. Relatedly, Liu et al. have also argued for 
the need of prescriptive standards of order via the 
development of what they term as shared “motor themes” 
[36].  
Inadequacy 
The second and interrelated expression of anxiety is that of 
HCI’s (intellectual) inadequacy when positioned as an 
academic discipline against a roster of other, better 
established disciplines. In 2002 panel, positions on this 
were represented in a panel of key HCI figures 
(Shneiderman, Card, Norman, Tremaine and Waldrop) 
discussing 20 years of the CHI conference [55]. 
Shneiderman argued the importance of “gain[ing] 
widespread respect in the scientific communities”, Norman 
commented on HCI as a “second-class citizen”, while Card 
reflected on his aspirations for HCI to graduate to 
“something somewhere in the lower half of the engineering 
disciplines, maybe civil engineering”. The situation seems 
to be unchanged since 2002: in a foreword to a recent 
(2012) handbook for HCI, Shneiderman reflects that “HCI 
researchers and professionals fought to gain recognition, 
and often still have to justify HCI’s value with academic 
colleagues or corporate managers” [54]. 
These concerns are political ones—they are motivated by 
the ways in which HCI is seen to be judged by others 
(academics, research funders, etc.). As part of this it seems 
standard practice to perform disciplinary comparisons 
between HCI and disciplines that are formally labelled as 
‘sciences’, including physics (which remains the favoured 
model of scientific purity in positivistic philosophy of 
science), chemistry or biology [50 p. xii, 31]. More 
specifically, when considering the prospects of HCI’s 
position amidst ‘the disciplines’, this debate is often 
configured as a disciplinary contrast between the ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ sciences, and correspondingly, between the rigorous 
and the less disciplined, between the quantitative and the 
qualitative, between maturity and immaturity, and between 
the ideal-scientific and the striving-scientific. Bederson and 
Shneiderman present a paradigmatic expression of this in an 
attempt to explain the inadequacies: “Mature scientific 
domains, such as physics and chemistry, are more likely to 
have rigorous quantitative laws and formulas, whereas 
newer disciplines, such as sociology, or psychology, are 
more likely to have qualitative frameworks and models” [2] 
(also see Card’s comments on this [55]). Such comparisons, 
we might note, are of course performed under the 
assumption of an essential disciplinary comparability, in 
spite of the questions over the relevance of this 
endeavour—a point I return to later. 
THE SCIENTIFIC DESIGN SPACE AND HCI 
In order to understand the twin anxieties of incoherence and 
inadequacy, I think it helps to return to HCI’s formation. By 
examining how some key features of present-day HCI 
emerged from the research labs of North America in 
particular, this section discusses the intellectual origins of 
an orienting concept: the scientific design space. As part of 
this I am interested in the relationship to both the ‘picture of 
science’ in HCI as well as ideas of architecting HCI as a 
(possibly) scientific discipline. In closing, this section then 
turns to assess some of the intellectual foundations of this 
concept, based in Simon’s perspective of design and 
science. 
Designing the mouse 
Prior to broad recognition of HCI as a distinctive, name-
able research activity—and naturally prior to debate about 
its status even as a ‘discipline’—the design of the human-
computer interface was primarily approached by pioneering 
research labs as a construction problem involving the 
provision of some possible control of a computer system. 
Many early fundamental interaction techniques were 
initially conceived of in this way (e.g., direct manipulation, 
the mouse, windowing environments [42, 41])—i.e., as 
primordially technological engineering endeavours that 
aimed to produce task-functional and efficient user 
interfaces. Verification of the usability of such interfaces 
tended to be applied only after design decisions had been 
made and implemented [10 p. 2]. Challenges were mounted 
to this software engineering focussed approach by nascent 
HCI. From this emerged a pairing between design work and 
cognitive scientific work [9]. Norman described this as 
“cognitive engineering” [46], although he retained a 
separation between the different roles of design and 
cognitive science. Yet, as we will see, the situation of this 
pairing in its formation was ambiguous in terms of whether 
it also is a conflation of the two.  
 
 
The practical foundations of the scientific design space (i.e., 
a science of design [9], not the scientific study of design 
[14]) erupted from research within Xerox PARC, perhaps 
illustrated most emblematically by Stuart Card and his 
pioneering work on the computer mouse. In the book 
Designing Interactions [41]—documenting the history of 
the design of interactive systems and devices using first-
hand accounts from its key players—Moggridge states of 
the computer mouse: “Stu [Card] was assigned to help with 
the experiments that allowed [mouse developers Doug 
Englebart and Bill English] to understand the underlying 
science of input devices”. Card’s aim was, in his own 
words, to develop a “supporting science” that would 
undergird the design activity of emerging interface 
technologies like the mouse or the desktop metaphor based 
graphical user interface. While earlier human factors and 
software engineering influenced work in HCI had been 
concerned with the use of ergonomic theory, its role in 
relation to design was generally verificationist [9, 10 p. 2], 
i.e., not used in predictive ways that serviced design. Basic 
atheoretic trial-and-error engineering approaches were 
typically being used at the time: in optimising the mouse’s 
design Card states that “the usual kind of A-versus-B 
experiments between devices” were no longer sufficient 
since “the problem with them was that [English, the 
designer] did not really know why one [mouse design] was 
better than the other” [41 p. 44]). 
Card instead saw a role for “hardening” the “soft sciences 
of the human-computer interface” [43] through applying 
cognitive science as a way of explaining why interfaces 
failed or succeeded and thus predictively guiding design 
work. Cognitive science, offering a representational theory 
of the mind, could be deployed in order to construct a 
correct “theory of the mouse” [41 p. 44] based on theories 
of interoperating mental structures that were being 
developed in cognitive science research. Although initially 
drawing upon the non-cognitive behaviourist model of 
Fitts’s Law and Langoff’s work on this, Card’s work 
integrated this into a fuller assembly of cognitive units (e.g., 
perceptual processors, motor processors, memory stores, 
etc.). Cognitive psychology, with its mappings between 
human action and cognitive units, offered explanations for 
how Card might formally rationalise a ‘design space’ of the 
mouse so as to guide the mouse designers’ work along the 
right pathway according to the predictions of cognitive 
science. In this sense, cognitive science was employed to 
‘tame’ the apparent ‘irrationality’ of design work. 
At times Card’s novel application of cognitive psychology 
challenged assumptions about what was actually important 
for design decisions being made for input devices like the 
mouse. For example, using this approach Card found that 
the differences between mouse designs was more to do with 
hand-eye coordination than the device itself. In addition to 
its explanatory power, Card found that applying cognitive 
scientific concepts to conceptualise and shape the design 
space could also be generative; it could offer different 
design possibilities through prediction. For example, it was 
found that by designing a mouse-like input device that 
incorporated “putting fingers together you can maybe 
double the bandwidth [of input precision]”. This resulted in 
some clear advice for designers: to “put your transducer in 
an area that is covered by a large volume of motor cortex” 
[41 p. 45]—i.e., direct the design towards the capacities of 
the cognitive motor processor and its relationship to the rest 
of the cognitive subsystem. From this example it becomes 
clear how the cognitivist orientation was applied not only to 
the user, but also in shaping the idea of a scientific approach 
to the design space itself. Card, Mackinlay and Robertson 
later summarised this approach thus: “Human performance 
studies provide the means by which design points in the 
space can be tested. We can use this basic approach as a 
means for systematizing knowledge about human interface 
technology, including the integration of theoretical, human 
performance, and artifact design efforts.” [6].  
The scientific design space approach and HCI’s 
disciplinary architecture 
The scientific design space of Card and others offers a 
consistent and strong visionary prescription for how 
research in HCI can proceed. That Card and colleagues 
have had a large influence on much of HCI’s development 
in uncontroversial, but I argue that some aspects of this 
influence on key forms of reasoning in HCI have been 
overlooked. In this section, I explore its role in the broader 
endeavour of describing and prescribing HCI’s 
disciplinarity. In this sense, I am interested in how the 
scientific design space offers solutions to some of the 
disciplinary anxieties of HCI. 
In 1983’s The Psychology of Human-Computer Interaction, 
Newell, Card and Moran sought to develop “a scientific 
foundation for an applied psychology concerned with the 
human users of interactive computer systems” [8]. Card 
would later point to the development of the mouse as an 
“ideal model of how the supporting science could work” 
[41 p. 45]. Although this hinted at a separation between 
design space exploration and cognitive science, the nature 
of that relationship remained largely unspecified. Yet, 
drawing out the implications of this “ideal model” meant 
extending the scientific design space of the mouse to a 
scientific design space approach for human-computer 
interactions more generally. The first step was to consider 
input devices as a whole [6], but linked to a broader 
prescriptive programme of “discovering the structure of the 
design space and its consequences” [7].  
 
 
A clearer scientific disciplinarity to HCI was also 
developed subsequent statements. In 1985 Newell and Card 
presented a vision for the role of psychological science in 
HCI. This work offered a descriptive account of a layered 
model in which temporal bands (between decades and 
milliseconds) map to different action units, associated 
memory and cognitive capacities, and the relevant 
theoretical bands which apply [43] (see Figure 1). Within 
this schema HCI’s phenomena of interest sit largely within 
the psychological and bounded rationality bands, happening 
to coincide precisely with the concerns of cognitive science 
of the time and ordering the rest of the space in terms of 
various related sciences.  
The significance of this layered model should not be 
underestimated. It offers a unified, reductive organisation 
that is similar to positivistic philosophy of science where 
higher order sciences are reducible to lower ones 
(ultimately physics) [20]. In this scheme, it is social and 
organisation science, various ‘levels’ of the cognitive 
sciences, neurosciences, and biological sciences, that fill in 
this order. Critically, this model for HCI is also cumulative: 
thus, latter developments such as Information Foraging 
Theory [48]—an influential theory that explains the 
information search and collection behaviours of web users 
(for example)—fit within the ‘rational’ band, yet build upon 
lower, more foundational bands from which information 
foraging “gains its power and generality from a 
mathematical formalization of foraging and from a 
computational theory, ACT-R, of the mind” [32].  
As a guiding notion of hierarchical disciplinary order, this 
work seems to have been influential in sparking attempts at 
descriptions of HCI. Firstly, Carroll, while in disagreement 
with Newell and Card’s presentation of the role of 
psychology in HCI [12], elsewhere concurs to some extent 
with this organisation in terms of “level of description. 
Thus, perception and motor skill are typically thought of as 
‘lower’ levels of organization than cognition; cognition, in 
turn, is a lower level of organization than social 
interaction.” [10]. 
Shneiderman also adopts this hierarchical descriptive model 
of relationships between more fundamental and ‘higher’ 
sciences. For instance he distinguishes between “micro-
HCI”, where researchers “design and build innovative 
interfaces and deliver validated guidelines for use across the 
range of desktop, Web, mobile, and ubiquitous devices”, 
and “macro-HCI”, which deals with “expanding areas, such 
as affective experience, aesthetics, motivation, social 
participation, trust, empathy, responsibility, and privacy” 
[53]. Macro and micro HCI have “healthy overlaps” yet 
have different “metrics and evaluation methods”. 
Finally, Rogers presents a description of HCI that seems 
oriented by a similar hierarchical sensibility. In HCI 
Theory: Classical, Modern and Contemporary, HCI’s 
(scientific?) disciplinary structure is a logical, hierarchical 
arrangement of “paradigms, theories, models, frameworks 
and approaches” that vary in scale, “level of rigor, 
abstraction and purpose” [50 p. 4]. In this scheme 
paradigms are the large scale “shared assumptions, 
concepts, values and practices” of a research community, 
while a theory indicates an empirically “well-substantiated” 
explanatory device that resides within a particular 
perspective or theoretical tradition (and is presumably 
associated with a particular paradigm). Beneath this sit 
models, which are predictive tools for designers, of which 
Fitts’ Law is the most familiar. 
Unpacking the idea of the scientific design space 
Returning again to the core idea of the scientific exploration 
of the design space, here I want to unpack its orienting 
ideas. In doing so, I think we can better understand the lines 
of reasoning being deployed in its pursuit. 
The central idea of design spaces and their systematic and 
empirical investigation as a scientific matter seems to have 
a strong resonance with the work of Herbert Simon. Simon 
was frequent collaborator with Newell, whom Card had 
been a student of. Simon’s influential book, The Sciences of 
the Artificial [56], is important for this concept in that that 
not only lays out a programme for a scientific approach to 
design but also discusses this within the context of Simon’s 
prior work around solution-searching within bounded 
rationality (e.g., ‘satisficing’).  
In essence Simon argues that the phenomena of the design 
activity itself demands a scientific approach of its very 
own: a new “science of design” [56 ch. 5], but one that is 
unshackled from the tendency to employ methods from the 
natural sciences. Simon’s conception of this new science of 
design shares a link to the formulations of Card, Newell and 
others that I described earlier. Crucially, both these 
approaches conceptualise design as an optimisation 
problem. As an optimisation problem, the design of “the 
artificial” (here meaning human-constructed objects such as 
 
Figure 1: Architecting the discipline—positioning HCI 
within a scientific order (figure reproduced from [43]). 
 
 
interactive digital artefacts) may be rendered as dimensions, 
enumerated, rationalised, and essentially made docile. This 
step gives rise to the application of a spatial metaphor of 
design: i.e., the idea of a design space that is 
“parametrically described” and populated with “device 
designs as points” [7]. Card positions cognitive science as a 
scientific way to “structure the design space so that the 
movement through that design space was much more rapid” 
[41 p. 45]. Simon offers a more generalised version of this: 
design spaces not only of artefacts but also economic, 
organisational and social systems. This view is broad and 
encompassing, and it is perhaps a conclusion drawn from a 
fundamentally cognitive conception of the mind. Hence 
Simon states that “the proper study of mankind is the 
science of design” [56 p. 138]. For Simon a scientific 
approach to designing such things involves constructing all 
design problems as computational spaces—ones that are 
amenable to formalisation and therefore computational 
search, optimisation and so on. And it is this notion which I 
argue undergirds the design space concept as it has found 
its way into forming a scientific approach to HCI research. 
Returning to the disciplinarity question once again, the 
scientific design space idea in its broader construction from 
Simon seems to offer both security for the status of HCI (in 
terms of academic adequacy and coherence), and also 
answers some of the questions presented earlier regarding 
the status of HCI as a discipline—whether engineering, 
craft or science [38]. The idea effectively responds by 
reformulating design problems in ways that let them be 
“reduced to declarative logic” [16 p. 176], meaning that 
“design [becomes] a system with regular, discoverable 
laws” [24 p. 26]. We will return to this topic of ‘design’ in 
the closing of the discussion section.  
DISCUSSION 
Having firstly described HCI’s disciplinary anxieties, and 
then covered formative concepts around scientific design 
spaces, the discussion now broadly explores the relations 
between them. I will initially do this through picking apart 
the intellectual coherence of the design space approach. 
First I argue that this idea has been very important in HCI 
research, and moreover, still is particularly in the evaluation 
of novel input devices. Then I wish to discuss the 
conceptual problems of the ‘scientific design space’, and in 
doing so must necessarily also turn to tackle the more 
general issue of the role of ‘science’ in HCI. Finally, I turn 
to review the introduction of ‘designerly’ perspectives in 
HCI and examine how this relates to scientific design 
spaces. 
The adoption of scientific design spaces in HCI 
Via Card and others, it seems that Simon’s way of 
conceptualising the design of artefacts has been a 
significant contributor to HCI’s ‘DNA’. Yet this impact of 
Simon on HCI is only occasionally acknowledged [9].  
This influence was initially made possible through the 
importance of cognitive science in HCI’s formation. 
Conceptually the prospect of transforming design problems 
into reductive computational spaces (to be addressed by 
scientific methods) was facilitated by the central 
implications of a ‘strong’ cognitive science position. 
Specifically this position offers an isomorphism between 
the computer and the human (i.e., as a cognitive object, 
with various input / output modalities). There are two key 
conflations that follow: firstly that the human is 
computational, or can be described with computational 
concepts; and secondly that the designer and therefore 
design itself is computational. This underlying idea in HCI 
has enabled the adoption process of the design space model.  
The practical expression of these ideas may be readily 
found the research outputs of many HCI conference venues 
like CHI and UIST, but also in those of related 
communities such as Ubicomp. Following Card and 
colleagues, it has become the approach of choice for work 
that evaluates novel input or output devices, but also for 
innovative interaction techniques for established interface 
forms (e.g., GUIs, touch and gestural interfaces, etc.). The 
‘ideal expression’ of the scientific design space is often 
conducted under the broader glossed label of psychology. It 
characteristically involves engaging in task-oriented 
interface evaluations via a hypothesis-driven experimental 
format—being often classed as ‘usability evaluation’ [26]. 
In building hypotheses and delivering their results, classic 
features of cognitive science theory are recruited, for 
example cognitive objects like memory, task load and so 
on. This might also include methods where the rationale is 
grounded in cognitive science reasoning, such as ‘think 
aloud’ techniques. Hypothesis testing enables an organised 
and systematic traversal of the design space particular to the 
class of device and interface under investigation [6, 7]. As 
part of this, cumulative, replicable, generalisable and 
theoretically-informed findings are delivered both to HCI as 
a whole but also potentially back to cognitive science as 
instances of applied research. It is also possible that 
attempts to form novel cognitive theory specific to 
interactive systems may result, for example Information 
Foraging theory presents one well-known instance of this 
(also note its relationship to the ACT-R cognitive 
architecture [48]).  
As an adoption phenomenon in HCI, this approach seems 
very well-established. But complaints have emerged about 
the trappings of this approach being prioritised at the 
expense of “rigorous science” [26]. For instance, Greenberg 
and Buxton articulate this trend as one of “weak science” in 
HCI that is more concerned with the production of one-off 
“existence proofs” of designs than systematic rigour that 
can “put bounds” on the wider design space under test [26]. 
In comparison, Card, Mackinley and Robertson emphasise 
the importance of uncovering design space structure [7], 
and through this taking different device designs as inputs or 
“points in a parametrically described design space” [7]—in 
 
 
other words, “systematizing” [6]. In contrast, the 
prioritisation of existence proofs has meant theory-free 
meandering explorations of an unspecified design space 
with little clear epistemic justification for taking a design 
space approach in the first place—or to put it another way, 
the methods of this approach end up deciding the problems 
to be tackled [26]. The scientific design space is something 
of a ‘muscle memory’ for HCI’s relationship to interactive 
devices and systems. 
I must note, of course, that there are broader issues at play 
here in HCI beyond the intellectual framework of design 
spaces. For instance, publishing cultures that reward 
quantity and the ‘least publishable unit’ will also tend to 
tolerate existence proofs. This is likely encouraged or at 
least further enabled by the idea of ‘scientific’ cumulative 
progress in HCI. 
Design spaces and scientific method 
Now that I have discussed the adoption of the scientific 
design space mode of HCI research, I wish to tackle the 
very idea itself in two ways. In this section here I will argue 
that this mode of work borrows from the natural sciences in 
spite of Simon’s original articulation. In the section after 
this I will link the discussion to much more general issues 
around the notion of ‘science’ itself in HCI’s discourse. 
The first point is that curiously, even given his call for 
genuinely new sciences of the artificial that were 
specifically not derivative of the natural sciences, the 
position Simon outlines nevertheless relies upon this 
strategy anyway. It seems that this is a product of the way 
in which Simon conceives of and specifies design as an 
activity—and how this could help knowledge about design 
move on from what he saw as “intellectually soft, intuitive, 
informal, and cook-booky” ways of conceiving of it at the 
time [56 p. 112].  
As Ehn expresses it, Simon performs something of a ‘trick’ 
which “poses the problem of design of the artificial in such 
a way that we can apply the methods of [formal] logic, 
mathematics, statistics, etc., just as we do in the natural 
sciences” (original emphasis) [16 p. 175]. In other words, 
because of Simon’s conceptualisation of design activities in 
terms of spatial, computable design spaces that are 
essentially reduced to search problems, the deck becomes 
stacked in such a way that ‘textbook’ understandings of the 
methods of the natural sciences just happen to turn out to be 
the relevant choice. And, following Simon, we find the 
science of the design space in HCI also relies upon 
perceived methods of the natural sciences. Interestingly, 
this perception is itself second-hand: it is actually that of 
cognitive science’s version of the methods of the natural 
sciences not the actual practices per se. 
The second point here is the lack of clarity in this notion 
around design and science as activities (I shall come to 
unpack ‘science’ and ‘design’ in the sections following this 
one). Specifically we could draw a distinction between 
three forms: 1. design as a (cognitive) scientific activity; 2. 
the application of (cognitive) science in design—i.e., 
retaining some notional separation between these activities; 
3. the development of scientific understandings of design 
itself (see [14 ch. 7]).  
The question for the scientific design space in HCI is based 
around some blurring between the first two forms. In some 
ways the initial programme of Card’s recounted in 
Designing Interactions appears different to Simon’s, yet in 
others seems to have a similar end result. At first glance 
Card seems to position his work as offering a “supporting 
science” that does not replace design (i.e., the application of 
cognitive science to design). He reminds us that it still 
requires “good designers to actually do the design” [41 p. 
45]. Yet, I think the picture is somewhat more complex than 
this. In later work, such as morphological design space 
analysis [7], extant designs become ‘inputs’ to a design 
space which itself generates the parameters along which 
“good designers” must work. In this way designers must 
engage with the predictive authority of the (cognitive) 
scientific shaping of the design space—so as to “alter the 
designer’s tools for thought” [44]. (Card, Mackinley and 
Robertson’s story of the “headmouse” user is also worth 
reflecting upon in this regard [7 p. 120].)  
HCI’s ‘picture of science’ 
At the core of the design space notion—I believe—is a 
desire to bring some aspect of (or perhaps all of) HCI closer 
towards a scientific disciplinarity. Doing so offers the 
promise of addressing anxieties over incoherence and 
inadequacy. Yet in order to better understand this I argue 
that we must start to unpack what is meant by ‘science’ and 
how it is used in HCI’s discourse. I also wish to bracket off 
‘science’ and ‘science talk’ more generally and look at what 
is done with it. After examining this, I then move on to 
contrast these deployments with understandings of 
scientific practice from philosophy of science and empirical 
studies of scientists’ work—contrasts that reveal a 
problematic dissonance between the two. 
Perhaps the first debates over what kind of science might be 
relevant to HCI can be found in the Newell, Card, Carroll 
and Campbell exchanges of the early 1980s [43, 12, 44]. 
Here, Carroll and Campbell took issue over Newell and 
Card’s characterisation of “hard science” (“quantitative or 
otherwise technical”) and “soft, qualitative science” [43] in 
their arguments about the possible role of science (cognitive 
psychology) in HCI. As Carroll and Campbell disputed, this 
was a “stereotype of hard science” and psychology itself; a 
false dichotomy around science was created by Newell and 
Card in order to support a positivist programme [12].  
Since then, discourse on ‘science’ in HCI research broadly 
has featured a web of conflicting deployments of the term. 
These deployments can offer both descriptions of HCI as 
scientific and prescriptions about ensuring that HCI is 
scientific (in some way). It is possible to offer two 
 
 
contrasting poles of this so as to illustrate the difficulties. 
At one end ‘science’ can be deployed in its loosest meaning 
as a synonym of rigour. For instance, I would suggest that 
Carroll often uses this formulation (see [11]); it is an 
invocation that seems to avoid scientism or positivist 
assumptions. At the other end of the scale we see ‘science’ 
being used to denote a specific set of ‘scientific qualities’ 
that are seen as gold standards of being scientific. 
Elsewhere I have summarised what is typically meant here 
in terms of three linked concepts [49]: 1. accumulation—
science’s work is that of cumulative progress (e.g., [44, 
57]); 2. replication—science’s work gains rigour from 
being reproducible by ‘anyone’ [28]; and 3. 
generalisation—science’s cumulative work builds toward 
transcendent knowledge. As part of this, various other 
descriptions of what it means to be “more scientific” [35] 
are pointed to: an adherence to the scientific method, 
empiricism and the “generation of testable hypotheses” 
[32]. In this sense ‘science’ is produced as a description of a 
general knowledge production procedure that offers 
standardisation and guarantees against ‘bias’. In this 
account ‘science’ represents a self-correcting incremental 
process of knowledge accumulation: “the developing 
science will gradually replace poor approximations with 
better ones” [34]. 
There are of course many other ways of talking about 
‘science’ which have found their way into HCI [49]. The 
most obvious would be in vernacular usage—where ‘being 
scientific’ is used in place of ‘being professional’, ‘being 
reasonable’, ‘being careful’ or ‘being scholarly’ and so on. 
Often these forms may be political, for example, using 
‘science’ as a rhetorical strategy to assert epistemic or 
moral authority (‘science’ as good work or a transcendent 
truth). It could also be used as a way of categorising 
research as scientific and non-scientific. Or it can be an 
aspirational label that requests peer recognition—for 
example, computer science rather than informatics [49]. It 
seems, then, that the overall ‘picture of science’ in HCI is 
confused. 
I wish to now to examine this picture with that presented by 
empirical studies of the natural sciences. The first general 
point that I address to the broad HCI description / 
prescription of ‘science’ is the difference between formal 
accounts of science (e.g., scientific papers) and the material 
practices that are carried out to produce them. In 
ethnomethodological accounts of scientific practice the 
relationship between the two, and their essential 
inseparability, is explored. Livingston, for instance, 
describes the ad hoc and profoundly local achievement of 
performing everyday practical laboratory tasks (e.g., 
determining chemical soil composition). He makes the 
observation that “From an external point of view, the 
procedures themselves determined the results. From the 
point of view of those working in the lab, our joint 
experiences helped us find what those procedures were in 
practice and how we could make them work.” [37 p. 155]. 
Other studies of scientific work in astronomy, physics, 
chemistry and biology practice unpack the ‘lived order’ of 
these practices, describing how natural phenomena must be 
socially ‘shaped’ and transformed into scientific “Galilean 
objects” for presentation in academic papers and so on [21, 
39].  
Following this, I think that HCI discourse around ‘science’ 
broadly tends to make a common mistake in expecting 
formal accounts and material practices to be 
interchangeable, leading to various confusions (elsewhere 
this necessary dissonance has even lead to accusations of 
fraud [40]). For instance, the replication of results as a 
necessity in principle for HCI has been described as “a 
cornerstone of scientific progress” [59]. This notion trades 
on the idea that formal accounts should provide an 
“adequate instruction manual for replication work” [28]. 
Yet when we turn to studies of the natural sciences, from 
which the principle is ostensibly extracted, we find that 
firstly most scientific results do not get replicated and 
secondly that where it is used, replication is a specifically 
motivated, pragmatic action for particular contested, 
relevant cases [13]. 
Not only is there the potential for confusion between formal 
accounts and material practices, but studies of the natural 
sciences also question the notion of the homogeneous way 
in which ‘science’ broadly is conceptualised, further 
problematising the term as we find it in HCI. This use tends 
to presuppose the existence of a coherent specific set of 
nameable enumerable procedures that make up ‘the 
scientific method’; procedures that are also held to be 
representative of a standardised approach to science in 
general. Philosophy of the sciences instead argues that there 
are sciences, plural, each sui generis, with no uniform 
approach or necessary promise of ultimate unity [20]. The 
notion of ‘the scientific method’ is itself questionable. 
Drawing attention to problems of an induction-based model 
of scientific progress, Feyerabend has instead argued that 
there exists “anarchistic methodology” and 
counterinduction in scientific practice that is not visible in 
formal accounts [18]. This is not that ‘anything goes’ 
methodologically, but rather that adherence to formal 
accounts of method alone cannot explain how science 
progresses. As Bittner puts it, the natural sciences have 
“tended to acquire arcane bodies of technique and 
information in which a person of average talent can partake 
only after an arduous and protracted preparation of the kind 
ordinarily associated with making a life commitment to a 
vocation” [3]. Hence it becomes potentially distorting to 
compress such a diverse set of practices into a singular but 
unspecifiable method of ‘science’ so as to draw out 
principles for being “more scientific” [35]. 
HCI’s relationship to design 
In this section I want to discuss another key element of the 
design space besides its ‘scientific’ sensibilities—‘design’. 
Of course, design has always been a concern for HCI 
 
 
research. As Card, Newell and Moran stated, “design is 
where the action is in the human-computer interface” [8 p. 
11]. The question is what kind of design—the deployment 
of the term ‘design’ is itself somewhat like ‘science’, i.e., a 
potential source of great confusion [61]. Regardless of the 
conceptual challenges I raised, Card and colleagues 
nevertheless very clearly articulated a strong sense of 
design following Simon. Yet I have argued this adoption at 
the same time provides an intellectual foundation to some 
of HCI’s recurrent concerns about developing a scientific 
disciplinarity. The formalised rigour of the scientific design 
space has meant this particular conceptualisation of design 
has flourished in HCI; this conceptualisation is grounded in 
background(ed) and unreflective scientific framing devices. 
It is for this reason that many novel interactive systems and 
technologies are still evaluated as inputs to the design space 
model. 
Since at least the late 1990s and certainly the early 2000s, 
however, HCI has seen the development of its own 
subcommunity of researchers concerned with what I will 
gloss here as ‘designerly’ perspectives (a gloss that I will 
later problematise). As they appear in HCI, designerly 
perspectives work with a range of terms like ‘design 
research’, ‘research through design’, etc.; to highlight a few 
examples I discuss here: [17, 60, 61, 19, 62, 22]. This 
relatively small but distinct subcommunity is one of the few 
places in HCI that actually foregrounds Simon’s conception 
of design—which is suggested by some to be a 
“conservative account” [17]. In this account, Simon 
effectively democratises and deskills design by arguing that 
“[e]veryone designs who devises courses of action aimed at 
changing existing situations into preferred ones” [56 p. 
111]. This logically flows from his bounded rationality 
view of design as search. 
Yet within the context of this designerly perspective, it has 
been argued that traditions along the lines of the scientific 
design space model tend to mask wider discussion about the 
nature of the design activity itself; as Fallman argues, 
“Design is thus a well-established and widespread approach 
in HCI research, but one which tends to become concealed 
under conservative covers of theory dependence, fieldwork 
data, user testing, and rigorous evaluations” [17]. In short, 
the absence of designerly alternatives to Simon has meant 
design is “at best limiting and at worst flawed” in its usage 
in HCI [60]. 
Yet, following the pattern of eclectic importations of new 
literatures to HCI, these debates around designerly 
perspectives typically (perhaps necessarily) offer a 
somewhat simplified presentation. As a point of contrast, 
Johansson-Sköldberg detects five interrelated but different 
discourses of “designerly thinking”: as creation of artefacts 
(Simon), as reflexive practice (Schön), as problem-solving 
(Buchanan), as sense-making (Cross), or as meaning-
creation (Krippendorff) [33]. Within HCI accounts of 
design, the literature tends to brush over such nuances, 
although there have been distinctions made between design 
practice and critical design [61].  
Further, as they are expressed within HCI, designerly 
perspectives have similar rehearsals of arguments around 
matters of disciplinary order, anxieties [19], and the 
relevance of scientific disciplinarity to design as an activity. 
For example, Zimmerman, Stolterman and Forlizzi 
specifically call for research through design to “develop 
protocols, descriptions, and guidelines for its processes, 
procedures, and activities” and find its own sense of 
“reliability, repeatability, and validity” [62]. Gaver 
characterises this as designerly approaches succumbing to 
HCI’s tendency towards scientism [22]. It seems that the 
debate around these designerly perspectives is thus no less 
susceptible to HCI’s orienting conversations around 
(scientific) disciplinarity that I have discussed in this paper. 
However, perhaps because of the struggle for recognition in 
HCI, designerly perspectives do tend to consistently 
emphasise the importance of assessing and valuing 
designerly research correctly—the argument being that the 
products of this work do not always fit with how HCI 
values research. This is highlighted by Gaver (“appropriate 
ways to pursue our research on its own terms” [22]), Wolf 
et al. (“its own form of rigor” [60]), Fallman and 
Stolterman (“rigor and relevance have to be defined and 
measured in relation to what the intention and outcome of 
the activity is” [19]), and Zimmerman, Stolterman and 
Forlizzi (“a research approach that has its own logic and 
rigor” [62]). Yet this argument about rigour has not been 
generalised to HCI as a whole and remains stuck within the 
frame of the designerly perspective attempting to gain 
legitimacy within the HCI community—in concluding I 
want argue for that generalisation. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have sought to examine disciplinary anxieties 
in HCI through picking apart its ongoing relationship to 
‘science’. This has meant identifying the idea of the 
scientific design space—an approach conceiving of 
designed artefacts as scientific objects, influenced by 
formative early applications of cognitive science to input 
devices. This significant approach to design seems to have 
subsequently configured much HCI research discourse, 
leading to  discussions around scientific qualities of 
accumulation, replication, and generalisation. Yet, as I have 
tried to show, matters of science and scientific disciplinarity 
in this perspective are somewhat problematic conceptually 
and far from settled. Further, in spite of announcements 
over HCI’s various ‘turns’ and successive ‘waves’ [5] of 
development, or even ‘paradigms’ [30], I have contested 
that some of the key assumptions of HCI have been quite 
resilient to such apparent changes, even with the 
introduction of designerly perspectives to HCI that 
challenge Simon’s conceptualisation of design—indeed, 
there we also find similar debates played out around 
(design) science and (design) disciplinarity. 
 
 
In concluding I wish to suggest two implications. Firstly, 
that HCI researchers should—with some caveats—stop 
worrying about ‘being scientific’ or engaging in ‘science 
talk’ and instead concern themselves with working in terms 
of appropriate forms of rigour. Secondly, that HCI 
should—again, with some caveats—stop worrying about 
disciplinary order or ‘being a discipline’ and instead engage 
with the idea of being interdisciplinary and all the potential 
difficulties and reconfigurations that requires. 
From science to rigour 
The first point turns on ‘science’ in HCI. To summarise, the 
paper has presented the role that ‘science’ plays in 
descriptions of HCI, e.g., accounts of HCI research as 
having scientific qualities. Secondly the paper has 
highlighted the use of ‘science’ in building prescriptions for 
HCI research, e.g., programmes by which HCI research can 
be conducted as a scientific discipline of design. These 
descriptions and prescriptions pertain to HCI research 
practice. Yet, in both cases I have tried to show that these 
are problematic when we consider how these articulations 
compare with what the model—the natural sciences—looks 
like as a set of lived practices. I have argued that the model 
being invoked by HCI—i.e., formal accounts—and the 
everyday material practices of natural scientists do not 
match up (for good reason), meaning that the case for 
employing said formal accounts of ‘science’ as a descriptor 
of or prescription for HCI seems weak and potentially 
confusing. At the most charitable we might say that 
‘science’ could be used as a synonym for rigour, albeit a 
highly loaded one. 
In abandoning the formal-scientific, I want to emphasise the 
notion of appropriate rigour. This is the idea that rigour in 
HCI must be commensurate with the specific intellectual 
origins of the work; e.g., this may be (cognitive, social, etc.) 
psychology, anthropology, software engineering, or, more 
recently, the designerly disciplines. This runs counter to the 
desire for hierarchical disciplinary orderings, 
standardisation, or other forms of positivist reductionism in 
HCI that I have discussed in this paper. Firstly, such 
orderings will necessarily foreground contradictory 
accounts of rigour, and secondly, invocations of ‘science’ 
will tend to replace focus on seeking the relevant frame of 
rigour. Instead, appropriate rigour is achieved “not through 
the methods by which data is collected, but through the 
ways in which the data can be kept true [...] during the 
analysis” [52]. 
To highlight the notion of appropriate rigour I point to the 
“damaged merchandise” controversy of the late 1990s, 
where the reliability and validity of well known usability 
methods in prominent studies were critiqued [25]. Perhaps 
one of the reasons why this critique produced a significant 
response [47] was that it took the studies to task using the 
intellectual framework that had been implicitly ‘bought 
into’ (cognitive psychology). As Greenberg and Buxton 
argue, “the choice of evaluation methodology—if any—
must arise from and be appropriate for the actual problem 
or research question under consideration” [26]. 
There are other purposes with which ‘science’ terms may 
be put to in HCI that might be necessary—albeit as a 
double-edged sword. For example, in political purposes, 
such as rhetorical, or persuasive uses, ‘science’ may have 
importance for communicating how HCI fits within 
research funding structures that adhere to the normative 
descriptive / prescriptive forms that this paper has 
questioned. The danger here, of course, is the apparent 
cynicism of this approach. 
From discipline to interdiscipline 
The second concluding point turns rethinking disciplinarity 
in HCI and concerns about constructing a rationalised 
disciplinary order. While the importance of 
multidisciplinarity has long been identified in HCI (e.g., 
[10]), what I argue for here is underlined by Rogers’s 
characterisation of HCI (for good or bad) as an “eclectic 
interdiscipline” [50 p. xi]. In other words, the difficulties of 
assembling HCI into some disciplinary order may be the 
natural state, the key characteristic of HCI. Reflecting upon 
this, Blackwell has suggested that HCI could be best 
conceived of as a catalytic interdiscipline between 
disciplines, rather than a discipline that engages in the 
development and maintenance of a stable body of 
knowledge [4]. If HCI is to be a rigorous interdiscipline 
then it will require working more explicitly at the interface 
of disciplines. We will need more reviews of and reflections 
upon the landscape of different forms of reasoning in HCI 
and through this better ways of managing how potentially 
competing disciplinary perspectives meet together. This 
paper has touched only one part of the landscape, but there 
are many more. 
At the same time it should be noted that there are dangers 
here too: being an interdiscipline can mean that HCI 
research diffuses into contributing disciplines and ‘credit’ is 
never recognised for HCI. This suggests that in addition to 
reconceptualising HCI as an interdiscipline, we must think 
of new and perhaps radical ways to characterise HCI as it is 
presented to the outside world. 
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